Empirical studies of structural changes and inflation by Palle S Andersen et al.
BIS Papers No 3 267
Understanding the recent behaviour of inflation:
an empirical study of wage and price
developments in eight countries
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Abstract
An important and surprising characteristic of the economies in industrialised countries in the 1990s
was the extent to which prices decelerated in an environment of generally rising economic activity and
tightening labour markets. The coexistence of a healthy economic environment and low inflation can
appropriately be described as good news. However, economists tended to overstate underlying
inflation pressures in many of these countries during most of the decade, and these prediction errors
demonstrate our lack of understanding of the inflation process and raise questions about the
appropriate stance of monetary policy in such an uncertain environment.
In this paper, we investigate the magnitudes and potential sources of inflation forecast errors during
the 1990s in a sample of eight industrialised countries. Our analysis consists of two separate
approaches. First, we examine the errors in official OECD forecasts, which we take to be
representative of the mainstream of macroeconomic analysis during that time. Second, we document
and analyse prediction errors in our own set of econometric specifications, which are loosely based on
the Phillips curve model of the inflation process.
Our analysis of OECD forecast errors is indicative of persistent overpredictions of price inflation for
most of the countries in our sample. In contrast, little bias is evident in the OECD forecasts of wage
inflation. The combination of the forecast errors for wages and prices thus implies that real wage
growth has been unexpectedly strong during the 1990s and that the major sources of the forecast
errors are likely to be located in that part of the Phillips curve framework which models firms￿ prices as
a mark-up on costs. More precisely, the unexpectedly slow rise in prices relative to wages could
indicate that firms have benefited from favourable supply shocks or that they lost pricing power during
the 1990s in that they were not able to fully pass on wage cost increases into their prices.
Our own models for consumer prices also consistently overpredict inflation in nearly every country.
Nonetheless, there is little statistical evidence of parameter instability. The one exception is a decline
in the intercept term in the 1990s, a finding indicative of structural change but, unfortunately, not
particularly helpful in identifying the source of the change. In contrast, the parameters in our wage
models appear to have changed in about half of the countries. However, no single coefficient stands
out as particularly sensitive to the addition of the more recent data.
1. Introduction
An important and, to many observers, surprising characteristic of the economies in industrialised
countries in the 1990s was the extent to which prices decelerated in an environment of generally rising
economic activity and tightening labour markets. Measured by the private consumption deflator, the
average inflation rate among OECD member countries fell from 4.6% in 1990 to just 1.2% in 1999,
while the average unemployment rate for 2000 was the lowest in 10 years. Moreover, for the first time
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since 1990 actual output for the whole OECD area exceeded potential output last year. To further
illustrate the degree of disinflation during the 1990s, only four industrial countries (Greece, Iceland,
Ireland and Spain) had an inflation rate higher than 2‰% in 1999, while in 1990 only three countries
(Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) had an inflation rate lower than 2‰%. Moreover, as we
shall discuss in this paper, economists evidently overstated underlying inflation pressures in many of
these countries during most of the decade, at least as indicated by the persistent overpredictions of
price changes evident across a wide range of forecasts. While the coexistence of a healthy economic
environment and low inflation can appropriately be described as good news, these prediction errors
also demonstrate our lack of understanding of the inflation process and raise questions about the
appropriate stance of monetary policy in such an uncertain environment.
Given that disinflation has occurred in so many countries, it might be expected that the primary reason
for this favourable development would be clearly evident and pertain to a large number of - if not all -
industrialised nations. Indeed, there is a general consensus as to the most likely sources of
disinflation, including monetary policies aimed at price stability, declines in relative import prices, a fall
in the natural rate of unemployment, increased globalisation and firms￿ loss of pricing power. However,
estimates of the contribution of these various sources and the degree to which they apply across
countries are not very precise, and thus there is less agreement as to the causes of the persistent
overpredictions of inflation over this period. For example, in some countries, most notably the United
States and Australia, an unanticipated increase in structural productivity growth is often cited as a key
cause. However, an increase in trend productivity is an unlikely candidate for consideration in many
continental European countries simply because no such improvement is evident in the statistics.
Similarly, while there are signs of higher productivity growth late in the 1990s in Canada, such
improvements came too late for productivity developments to be a credible source of forecast errors.
In several of these countries, as well as in the United Kingdom, labour market reforms (in many cases
aimed at increasing the labour intensity of output growth), inflation targeting and other structural
changes are typically highlighted instead.
In this paper, we investigate the magnitudes and possible sources of inflation forecast errors during
the 1990s in a sample of eight industrialised countries.
2 Our analysis consists of two separate
approaches. First, we examine the errors in official OECD forecasts, which we take to be
representative of the mainstream of macroeconomic analysis during that time.
3 Such an exercise
helps us document the direction and magnitude of forecast errors and allows us to look at possible
correlations between the surprises in wage and price inflation and surprises in other variables that are
typically included in forecasters￿ models of the inflation process. We then turn to our own set of
econometric specifications, which are loosely based on the Phillips curve model of the inflation
process. We again document the size of prediction errors made by these models, but we also use
them to test for possible structural change, either in the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment) or in the responsiveness of wage and price inflation to changes in the various
determinants of inflation included in the models.
To preview the results, our analysis of OECD forecast errors is indicative of persistent overpredictions
of price inflation for many - although not all - of the countries included in our sample; especially large
forecast biases are evident for the United States, Canada and Australia. In contrast to the results for
prices, little bias is evident in the OECD forecasts of wage inflation, with the notable exception of
Japan. For most countries, the combination of the forecast errors for wages and prices implies that
real wage growth was unexpectedly strong during the 1990s and that the major sources of the forecast
errors are likely to be located in that part of the Phillips curve framework which models firms￿ prices as
a mark-up on costs. Thus, the unexpectedly slow rise in prices relative to wages could indicate that
firms have benefited from favourable supply shocks or that they lost pricing power during the 1990s in
that they were not able to fully pass on wage cost increases into their prices. In contrast, the part of
the Phillips curve framework that models wages as a function of labour market slack and the expected
rate of inflation seems to contain fewer systematic errors.
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We also compared the forecast errors for wage and price inflation with the levels and forecast errors
for some of the standard determinants of inflation. In particular, we first analysed the correlation matrix
of these forecast errors, but found no dominant explanation for the OECD￿s overly pessimistic view of
inflation pressures in the 1990s. Larger than expected declines in relative import prices seem to be a
relevant explanation for some countries. However, a number of countries for which the bias in the
OECD inflation forecasts was small also benefited from lower import prices. For other countries, an
acceleration in productivity appears to be an important factor, while in still others, errors in forecasts of
the GDP gap and/or the unemployment rate appear to play a role. We also regressed the forecast
errors directly on the exogenous determinants of inflation to test for structural changes. Again, the
results varied across countries. Although there was evidence of some structural change in most cases,
the specific nature of the parameter changes differed considerably, ranging from a step-down in the
average rate of inflation to changes in the responsiveness of wages or prices to supply shocks or
cyclical influences.
Turning to our own specifications, the estimated models for consumer prices consistently overpredict
inflation in nearly every country. Nonetheless, there is little statistical evidence of parameter instability
in these models. The one exception is a decline in the intercept term in the 1990s, a finding indicative
of structural change but, unfortunately, not particularly helpful in identifying the source of the change.
In contrast to the price models, the cumulative forecast errors from our models of wage inflation are
negative in some countries but positive in others. Moreover, the parameters in about half of the
countries appear to have changed during the 1990s, although no single coefficient stands out as
particularly sensitive to the addition of the more recent data.
2. Alternative explanations of inflation developments in the 1990s
Recent characterisations of macroeconomic conditions have been influenced to a significant degree
by developments in the United States, where inflation and unemployment fell simultaneously over
much of the 1990s. Accordingly, many of the hypotheses advanced to explain this favourable
economic performance emphasise the US experience and underweight important developments
elsewhere in the industrialised world. That said, the following brief review also focuses mainly on
explanations put forward with regard to the US economy, although we attempt to include, where
appropriate, other hypotheses that seem more relevant elsewhere.
In general, the recent literature on this issue can be loosely classified into three broad categories.
4
The first includes arguments that the inflation process has irrevocably changed; on this view, the
models that economists have traditionally used to forecast inflation are no longer applicable. At the
other end of the spectrum are claims that recent inflation developments are easily explained in the
context of standard inflation models as long as various one-time supply shocks are accounted for. The
third category comprises those in the middle who argue that the underlying model of inflation still
holds, but that some of the key parameters may have changed. Because this group is very large, it is
useful to divide it into several subcategories, depending on the parameters of interest and the nature
of the changes. For instance, some parameter shifts may at first glance seem permanent, but are in
fact the manifestation of very long adjustment lags to either transitory or permanent changes in other
variables.
Returning to the first category and the argument that the inflation process has irrevocably changed,
such views often appear in the popular press with little explanation. But more serious proposals along
these lines seem to have their roots in the way that information technology has altered traditional
relationships between economic agents. For example, some proponents of this view cite DeLong and
Froomkin (1999), who argue that recent technological advances in electronic commerce and data
communications technology are leading to changes in how competitive markets function that may
have important implications for firms￿ price setting behaviour.
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Regarding claims that recent inflation developments are easily explained in the context of the standard
models of inflation, Rich and Rissmiller (2000) argue that a traditional Phillips curve model tracks US
inflation quite well during the 1990s and that a significant decline in import prices in that period is the
main source of the deceleration in prices. However, according to others, the decline in relative import
prices does not fully explain the decline in US inflation. For instance, Brayton et al (1999) find that an
equation including changes in relative import prices still tends to overpredict inflation, and the same is
true for our own estimates presented in Section 4.
5 Similarly, Gordon (1998) suggests that, in addition
to import prices, a substantial portion of the deceleration in prices is due to a combination of unusually
sharp declines in computer prices, extremely modest growth in the cost of medical care, and a
reduction in measured inflation relative to true inflation. Gordon further notes that the decline in US
inflation is not surprising given changes in capacity utilisation over the period. Leaving aside
ambiguities about the precise size of the shocks, one implication of these explanations is that the
shocks generating the favourable inflation outcomes may well be transitory and subject to reversal.
This contrasts sharply with the polar ￿new economy￿ view that low inflation represents a more
fundamental change in wage and price setting behaviour.
It is helpful to organise a review of the alternative explanations of inflation developments in the third
category around the standard reduced-form equations for price and wage inflation:
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where pc and w denote price and wage inflation respectively, Gap denotes the output gap, U-U* is
the unemployment gap (with U* a measure of the NAIRU), z and z￿ are supply side disturbances, and i
and j are lags in years.
At its simplest level, the third category would include the argument that the NAIRU has declined in
recent years.
6 Such a decline is variously attributed to a number of sources, including the impact of
technological change on productivity growth. While the consensus view is that higher productivity
growth has helped to keep inflation low and thus prolonged the expansion in several countries, it is
debatable whether its impact on the NAIRU is permanent or just the result of very long adjustment
lags. As pointed out by Blanchard and Katz (1997), productivity growth is neutral with respect to the
NAIRU in the long run if wage aspirations and reservation wages adjust to the change in productivity
growth. However, experience suggests that this adjustment is rather slow, so that if prices are set as a
mark-up on unit labour costs, price inflation will be lower during a period of adjustment, with the
slowdown most likely to be reflected in a lower intercept term ().
7 Alternatively, since the output level
associated with stable inflation temporarily increases, the effect of higher productivity growth may be
seen as a decline in the sensitivity of price inflation to the output gap ().
Another popular explanation for the recent good inflation performance involves increased globalisation
and an associated rise in competition in both national and international markets. To the extent that
these changes are permanent, they might affect most of the parameters in the above equations. For
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instance, the sensitivity of domestic prices and wages to changes in relative import prices ( and )
would be likely to increase. Moreover, a tendency for increased competition to curb firms￿ and wage
earners￿ real income aspirations might be reflected in a reduction of the intercept terms  and  or,
perhaps, in lower sensitivities to domestic market conditions ( and ).
Structural policies and an associated greater influence of market forces comprise another set of
explanations for the disinflation of the 1990s. In theory, such policies can improve the growth-inflation
trade-off through several interdependent channels (Dicks, 2000), but in practice, this explanation is
probably more relevant to the European countries in our sample than to the United States (Siebert,
1997).
8 As labour markets are freed up, one would expect a greater influence of market forces to lower
the NAIRU and possibly increase the sensitivity to labour market slack (). Similarly, in less regulated
product markets the output level associated with stable inflation would probably increase. Moreover,
the demand curves facing each firm are likely to be more elastic, encouraging or forcing firms to lower
their mark-ups. In practice, however, the effects of structural policies overlap with many of the
hypotheses considered above and they are also difficult to quantify. In addition, since the short-run
effects of deregulation and other structural measures on the real economy are frequently negative, the
time horizon over which the policies and their effects are analysed is of particular importance.
As highlighted in several other contributions, the coefficients in the typical forecasting equations may,
in part, depend on the level of inflation, though the sign of this influence is ambiguous. According to
Ball et al (1988), Lucas (1972) and Hutchison and Walsh (1998), nominal rigidities tend to increase
when inflation declines. However, more recent proponents of this view have argued that, in a
low-inflation regime, the sum of the coefficients on the lagged inflation terms (	j and 
j) tends to be
less than unity. This would imply that forecasts should be based on the ￿old-fashioned￿ downward-
sloping Phillips curve rather than on an equation with a long-run vertical slope. For example, Taylor
(2000) argues that the erosion in firms￿ pricing power during the late 1990s mainly resulted from a
decline in the persistence of inflation in a low-inflation regime. This lower persistence is likely to have
raised the elasticity of the demand curve facing firms and forced or encouraged them to reduce mark-
ups. Moreover, in a less persistent inflation environment, firms may reduce the pass-through of costs
into their own prices, which would be reflected in a smaller coefficient on past inflation.
9 In a low-
inflation economy, agents may also view exchange rate changes as mainly transitory, with the result
that domestic prices become less sensitive to exchange rate shocks. Indeed, several event studies
(the United Kingdom and Sweden following the ERM crisis in 1992, Australia in the aftermath of the
Asian crisis and Brazil in early 1999) suggest that the pass-through of exchange rate changes may
have fallen in the 1990s.
Others have focused on the process determining expectations of inflation or on the way in which
agents react to such expectations. For instance, Roberts (1997) finds that the expectation formation
process is not entirely rational. Akerlof et al (2000) go one step further by arguing that workers and
firms do not fully utilise information about inflation in determining wages and prices during periods of
persistently low inflation. Their hypothesis is supported by empirical estimates and results in dynamics
that are very similar to those highlighted by Taylor and thus deviate importantly from the traditional
accelerationist models of the inflation process.
10 The regime dependence of the coefficients is also
evident in Brainard and Perry (1999), who specify a model of US inflation that allows for time variation
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less persistence (ie a lower ) will lead to a lower pass-through. See Taylor, op cit, pp 10-11.
10 The model has the further implication that the unemployment rate associated with the optimal level of inflation is lower than
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in several of the key parameters and find that the estimated coefficient on lagged inflation declines
substantially in the 1990s.
11
Finally, Brayton et al (1999) focus on changes in the price mark-up in explaining US inflation during
the 1990s. By augmenting a traditional Phillips curve with an error correction term, measured as the
inverse of real unit labour costs, they find evidence of an unusually high price mark-up during the
1990s, and argue that this factor, rather than a falling NAIRU, explains much of the disinflation over
the last decade. Similarly, Gali et al (2000) rely on a mark-up model in analysing inflation in the euro
area. While their model successfully explains price inflation, it does so by making prices conditional on
labour costs rather than on economic activity, whereas in the model by Brayton et al both determinants
are present. As noted by Roberts (1999), however, this splitting of the Phillips curve into a price and a
wage component entails a risk that the former is well explained while developments in the latter (and
potential sources of prediction errors) may not be given sufficient attention.
All in all, the range of potential explanations reviewed in this section highlights the uncertainty faced by
policymakers in assessing current inflation risks and provides the motivation for the remainder of this
paper. However, it should be stressed that while trying to distinguish between various explanations is
intuitively appealing, such distinctions are often difficult to verify empirically. This is particularly true
when considering the different implications of transitory influences and permanent changes and it is
especially relevant to the 1990s, when a number of favourable supply shocks occurred more or less
simultaneously with other, more permanent changes.  While a model  would  ideally allow for the
influence of both structural shifts and transitory supply shocks, this is rarely possible in practice and is
particularly difficult when the sample period is very short. Nonetheless, we will attempt to highlight
patterns that seem to us relevant to the question of whether the behaviour of inflation changed in the
1990s in the eight countries under consideration and, when it did, of the extent to which such a
change was the result of structural developments as opposed to temporary and potentially reversible
supply shocks.
3. Forecast errors in the 1990s
a. The OECD forecasts
In this section, we analyse the size and sign of inflation forecast errors, using forecasts of wage and
price developments made by the OECD. These forecasts are prepared twice each year and presented
in the semiannual Economic Outlook. For the purposes of this study, we take the forecasts for the
following year as of June of the current year and compare them to the actual outcome as currently
published.
12 Throughout this section, we measure forecast errors as forecast less outcome so that a
positive error indicates that inflation has been overpredicted.
We should emphasise that we have not chosen this source with the intention of criticising the OECD
forecasting procedures and record. On the contrary, the OECD forecasts offer several advantages
over possible alternatives. For example:
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  They provide a consistent set of time series with few breaks and virtually no changes in the
dates of the forecasts;
  They include forecasts of a number of additional variables that may be relevant when
searching for possible sources of errors;
  Forecast errors made by the OECD are generally of the same magnitude as those made by
other international institutions, for instance the IMF and the European Commission;
  Given the semiannual meetings of forecasters held at the OECD, the forecasts presented in
the Economic Outlook are fairly representative of official forecasts for individual countries.
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b. Properties of the inflation forecast errors
Tables 2 and 3 present the forecast errors for the period 1991-99 for changes in the consumption
deflator (pc) and compensation per employee in the business sector (w) respectively. The tables
are organised to show four standard measures used in forecast evaluation: accuracy, bias, efficiency
and serial correlation. However, as we are primarily interested in the extent to which conventional
forecasts overpredicted inflation during the 1990s, we shall focus on the bias and efficiency statistics.
Turning first to the results for price inflation (Table 2), the mean errors indicate that consumer price
inflation was overpredicted in all of the eight countries we analyse except for Spain and the United
Kingdom. Especially large and statistically significant mean errors are evident for Australia, the United
States and Canada. In each of these countries, the U
M statistic indicates that 50% or more of the total
mean squared error is due to the bias in the forecast. Moreover, as indicated by the % > 0 line, the
forecasts were too high for at least eight of the nine years considered. In spite of smaller average
prediction errors, the forecasts for several other countries also exhibit a tendency to overpredict
inflation. In particular, the forecasts for Japan, Sweden and Switzerland were too high more than 75%
of the time, possibly indicating that systematic errors in the forecasting procedure were also present
for these countries.
The existence of bias in the inflation forecasts for some countries also raises doubts about the
efficiency of these forecasts. In particular, an optimal forecasting procedure would yield forecast errors
with specific, well defined properties that can be derived through an optimisation problem. This can be
illustrated by assuming a linear relationship between the forecasts (y
f) and the outcomes (y):
     
f
t t y y (3)
and rearranging this with the forecast error as the left-hand variable:
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From this characterisation, the optimality conditions are seen to be consistent with the usual statistical
criterion for minimising the sum of squared errors and can thus be stated as:
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t y y y E    = 0
where E denotes expected values. The first condition requires the average forecast errors to be zero;
in other words optimal forecasts should be unbiased. According to the second condition, the forecasts
should also take account of all existing information. A necessary condition for this to be satisfied is that
(1-) = 0. In addition, current forecast errors should not repeat past errors, so a further requirement for
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efficiency is that the forecast errors are not serially correlated; we test for this using the Ljung-Box
Q-statistic.
14
Given that unbiasedness is a necessary condition for efficiency, it is not surprising that the forecasts
for the three countries for which the mean error is positive and statistically significant are also not
efficient. However, despite the small average errors, it also appears that the OECD forecasts for
Switzerland are inefficient. In contrast, there is no evidence of either inefficiency or serial correlation in
the OECD forecasts of inflation for the other four countries.
Some additional insights can be gleaned from the pattern of forecast errors shown in Chart 1. For
example, while the average forecast errors for Sweden and Switzerland are rather small, each of
these countries shows sizeable negative errors early in the 1990s, followed by a string of positive
errors over the remainder of the decade. Similarly, for Japan, positive errors for much of the decade
are largely offset by a large negative error in 1997, presumably because the introduction of a sales tax
pushed up inflation by more than predicted by the OECD. Even for Spain, the underprediction of price
inflation is mostly confined to the early part of the decade; in more recent years, the OECD has tended
to overpredict inflation, although the errors are relatively small. With regard to the United States and
Australia, the OECD forecasts show no obvious tendency to improve or worsen, while the errors for
Canada, albeit still generally positive, have mainly fallen over time.
Turning to the OECD forecasts of wage inflation (Table 3), the largest average errors are observed for
Japan and Australia, which are also the only countries for which the mean is statistically different from
zero. Indeed, according to the measures we report, there is little evidence of a significant bias in the
wage forecasts in any of the other six countries. Nonetheless, although the average forecast errors for
the United States and Spain are relatively small, the pattern of errors in both countries fails the
efficiency test. Among the other countries, forecast errors for Canada are predominantly positive,
albeit small, while the forecasts for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland satisfy all of the
standard optimality conditions.
As shown in Chart 2, the forecast errors for compensation growth exhibit some interesting patterns. In
the United States and Switzerland, for example, the OECD tended to overpredict compensation
growth during the first half of the 1990s, but more recent forecasts have shown no upward bias despite
the persistent positive errors in price forecasts. A similar pattern of positive errors in the first half of the
1990s is evident for Canada and the United Kingdom, although in the latter case the OECD has
consistently underpredicted wage growth in recent years. Among the other countries, the forecasts for
both Japan and Australia are consistently too high throughout the decade, while a tendency to
underpredict wage growth in Spain in the early part of the 1990s gave way to persistent
overpredictions beginning in 1994.
For the majority of countries in our sample, there seems to have been a greater tendency by the
OECD to overpredict price inflation than wage inflation, a pattern that is especially apparent when the
early 1990s are excluded from the time period we consider. Taken alone, and assuming that the
OECD forecasts are representative of mainstream expectations, our analysis of the OECD forecast
errors supports some explanations for the favourable performance of inflation in the 1990s more than
others. In particular, in the absence of clear evidence of persistent positive errors in the wage
forecasts, it is difficult to argue that there have been NAIRU declines associated with labour market
changes that were larger than those expected by the OECD forecasters. In contrast, the upward
biases in the forecasts for price inflation in many countries arguably point to a role for unanticipated
supply shocks of the type emphasised by Gordon (1998) and Rich and Rissmiller (2000) or for
globalisation and associated pressures on the mark-up, as suggested by Brayton et al (1999) and
Taylor (2000). Of course, the absence of a consistent pattern of forecast errors across countries raises
some questions about these interpretations, although the primary exceptions (Japan and Spain)
appear to have been unduly influenced by atypical domestic developments.
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c. A decomposition of the forecast errors
To investigate whether unexpected, but now identifiable, supply shocks were an important contributor
to the surprisingly low inflation rates of the 1990s or whether the forecast errors tend to be more
closely associated with changes in the parameters of the underlying structural model, we decomposed
the OECD forecast errors into two separate components. In particular, letting the subscripts f and a
denote the forecast and actual values respectively, we assume that the process used by the OECD to
generate the forecast value of inflation (y) can be represented as:
f f f f X y     (5)
where X represents the vector of exogenous variables used in the forecasting procedure. Similarly, the
process generating the outcomes is assumed to be represented as:
a a a a X y     (6)
The forecast error is the difference between these two equations:
a a f f a f a f X X y y          ) ( (7)
which can be rewritten as:
f a f a f a a f a f X X X y y      ) ( ) ( ) (        (8)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation provide an estimate of how the parameters
generating the outcomes differ from those generating the OECD forecasts and can be thought of as
an approximation to structural changes that have led to errors in the inflation forecasts. The last term
provides an estimate of the extent to which errors in OECD forecasts of the exogenous variables
contributed to the forecast errors.
15
Can forecast errors in other variables explain the overprediction of inflation?
Because we have only nine observations with which to work, we examine the two major pieces of this
decomposition separately. We consider first the potential effects of errors made by the OECD in its
forecasts of variables that could be considered inputs into standard models of wage and price inflation.
For instance, if import price inflation is overpredicted and import prices enter the price equation with a
positive coefficient, this might explain an overprediction of consumer prices as well. Similarly, on the
assumption that prices are set as a mark-up on unit labour costs, an underprediction of labour
productivity growth would contribute to an overprediction of price inflation. In contrast, underpredicting
labour productivity growth might be expected to cause an underprediction of wage inflation if workers
alter their wage aspirations in response to rising productivity. Forecast errors for the degree of slack
could also influence inflation forecasts. For instance, if the rate of unemployment were overpredicted,
either wage or price inflation might be expected to be underpredicted, giving rise to a negative partial
correlation between the prediction errors. Conversely, if the output gap turns out to be larger (ie more
negative) than predicted, the forecast error on inflation would also be positive, generating a positive
partial correlation between the errors.
In Table 4 we present the average values and forecast errors over the 1991-99 period for the four
exogenous variables considered. The strongest evidence for the supply shock hypothesis comes from
the fact that the OECD, on average, overpredicted import price inflation in every country during the
1990s. Similarly, average productivity growth was underpredicted (negative forecast errors) for the
United States, Australia and Sweden; in contrast, there are large positive and significant forecast
errors for productivity growth in Japan and Switzerland. Finally, in all countries, the OECD
                                                     
15 This procedure obviously makes strong assumptions about the relationship between the OECD forecasting procedures and
the data-generating process. In particular, we are implicitly assuming that the forecasts and outcomes are both generated
by the same set of variables so that there are no omitted variables. In addition, characterising differences in the parameter
values as structural changes implies that the OECD estimates of the parameters at the time the forecasts are prepared
represent the true values for the period prior to the forecast. Moreover, as Andersen (1997) notes, it is generally not
possible to definitively identify the sources of forecast errors in the framework we are using. For these reasons, the results in
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underpredicted the unemployment rate (negative forecast errors), although only five of these countries
show a commensurate positive forecast error in the degree of output slack.
As a more formal method of assessing the importance of these factors, Table 5 presents bivariate
regressions of the forecast errors in price and wage inflation on the forecast errors for the four
exogenous variables, along with regressions of the errors in the price forecasts on the errors in the
wage forecasts and vice versa. Interestingly, there are only two cases (Canada and Australia) where
forecast errors for price and wage inflation are significantly and positively correlated. In contrast, a
positive correlation between forecast errors for import prices and consumer prices is evident for most
countries. Indeed, given the size of the change in import prices and the associated forecast errors
shown in Table 4, the surprising weakness in import prices appears to have been an important source
of the overpredictions of price inflation.
The results also support the hypothesis that unexpectedly strong productivity growth contributed to the
overprediction of inflation in some countries. In particular, in both the United States and Australia, the
OECD underpredicted productivity growth in the 1990s, and in both countries, this underprediction
appears to be associated with the positive forecast errors for price inflation. The correlation between
the forecast errors for productivity and price inflation is also negative and statistically significant in
Japan, although in this case, an overprediction of productivity is systematically related to an
underprediction of price inflation.
Turning to the regressions of forecast errors of wage and price inflation on forecast errors of
unemployment, we find three countries (the United States, Japan and Australia) with the expected
negative correlations but also two cases (the United Kingdom and Spain) with a positive correlation.
For the gap measure, positive and significant coefficients were found for the United States and Japan,
which are consistent with the results for unemployment. However, we again find coefficients of
opposite sign for the United Kingdom and Spain. In addition, the results for the United States are
consistent with the traditional view that wages are more sensitive to utilisation rates than prices.
To what extent do these correlations of forecast errors ￿explain￿ the overpredictions of inflation during
the 1990s? Focusing on those countries for which Tables 2 and 3 suggested a systematic
overprediction, we would summarise the results in Tables 4 and 5 as follows:
 For  the  United States, a faster rate of decline in import prices than expected by the OECD
and a faster rate of productivity growth both appear to have been important sources of the
overprediction of price inflation. However, there are two caveats we would add to this
interpretation. First, much of the rapid decline in import prices over the period occurred in
imported investment goods and thus is only indirectly linked to consumer price inflation. This
suggests that some of the correlation between falling import prices and consumer price
disinflation may be coincidental. Second, the results indicate that the underprediction of
productivity growth contributed both to the overprediction of price inflation and the
underprediction of wage inflation in the 1990s. In other words, while external shocks are
important to the US inflation story, it appears to be productivity shocks rather than import
prices that have been the driving force.
 For  Australia, a very similar picture emerges, as productivity growth in the 1990s seems to
have been significantly underpredicted and this was transmitted into an overprediction of
consumer prices. It also appears that the interaction between price and wage inflation is an
important part of the disinflation process and of the inaccuracy of the forecasts, as the
bivariate correlation of the forecast errors for wages and prices is sizeable and statistically
significant.
 For  Japan, higher than expected import price inflation contributes the most to the
overprediction of price inflation. The forecast errors for productivity growth are significant but,
in contrast to the two countries discussed above, productivity growth has been
overpredicted. This helped to reduce the overprediction of price inflation in that country, but
also contributed to the overprediction of wage inflation. In addition, the OECD tended to
underpredict the unemployment rate during the 1990s, which also added to the positive
forecast errors for wages.
 For  the  United Kingdom, the results are difficult to relate to specific hypotheses discussed in
Section 2. In particular, price inflation was underpredicted slightly despite a tendency by the
OECD to overpredict the degree of slack during the 1990s. Some overprediction of
productivity, however, may be one source of the negative forecast errors for inflation.BIS Papers No 3 277
 For  Canada, a more negative than expected output gap and a positive correlation between
price and wage inflation appear to be the primary sources of the forecast error for price
inflation.
 For  Spain, we find a significant positive correlation between forecast errors for productivity
growth and wage inflation. This could potentially explain the overprediction of the latter, even
though the average forecast error for productivity growth is very small. On the other hand,
the underprediction of slack in both labour and product markets, coupled with the
correlations shown in Table 5, implies a tendency to underpredict inflation.
 For  Sweden, part of the overprediction of price inflation can be explained by an
overprediction of import prices. At the same time, while productivity growth appears to be
significantly underpredicted in Table 4, the corresponding bivariate regression coefficients
are small and insignificant. Similarly, the rise in the estimated degree of slack (as measured
by the output gap) and the associated forecast error do not seem to have contributed to the
forecast errors for inflation.
 For  Switzerland, a steeper fall in import prices than predicted by the OECD contributed to an
overprediction of price inflation, as did the overprediction of wage inflation combined with
relatively strong price-wage interaction effects. With regard to wage inflation, part of the
positive bias appears to be related to an underprediction of the unemployment rate.
Evidence of structural change
As indicated above, an alternative potential source of forecast error are structural changes that alter
the coefficients in the implicit model used by the OECD to forecast inflation. In particular, even if the
OECD correctly forecast the exogenous variables, forecast errors might arise if there are changes in
the responsiveness of inflation to these factors.
To test for this possibility, we regressed the forecast errors on the observed values of import prices,
productivity growth, unemployment and the output gap. As suggested by the decomposition shown
above, the parameters in these regressions are intended to represent estimates of the extent to which
the actual parameters prevailing over the 1990s differ from those implicitly used by the OECD in
making their inflation forecasts. As before, due to the paucity of observations, we used a set of
bivariate regressions to assess the possibility of structural change rather than a single multivariate
regression. Thus, these results, which are presented in Table 6, are again meant primarily to be
illustrative.
Similar to the absence of a ￿smoking gun￿ in the correlations between forecast errors of inflation and
forecast errors of the explanatory variable, there is no dominant parameter change evident in these
results. However, in most countries, there are some coefficients that are suggestive of structural
changes in the inflation process. In Australia, for example, the significant intercept coefficients provide
some evidence of a shift in the average rate of both price and wage inflation over the 1990s, which
could be interpreted as being associated with a decline in the NAIRU. The intercept term is also
statistically significant for the price inflation errors in the United States, but given the absence of a
significant effect on average wages and the evidence pointing to an increase in the response of wage
growth to productivity growth, these results are more suggestive of a structural change involving the
mark-up rather than of a fall in the NAIRU.
For other countries, the results are more difficult to interpret. For the United Kingdom, for example,
there is no evidence of structural change in the parameters influencing price inflation, but substantial
evidence of structural change in how wages are determined, although no single parameter dominates
the results. In Japan, prices appear to have become more sensitive to the output gap and to import
prices, while for wages, the intercept term points to a downward shift in the underlying pace of wage
growth. For Spain, the estimates suggest that wage growth has become more responsive to
productivity growth, which in turn has had a larger effect on price inflation. Finally, the results for
Sweden point to a greater cyclical response in wages and a greater sensitivity of price inflation to
import price shocks, while for Switzerland, there is evidence of a lower response of price inflation to
changes in productivity as well as an increased sensitivity to changes in unemployment.278 BIS Papers No 3
4. Structural changes, supply shocks and forecast errors
a. Some salient features of developments in the 1990s
As a preliminary to developing our own model-based tests of structural change, we first attempted to
get a ￿feel￿ for such changes by looking at actual developments in indicators of activity and inflation
(Table 7). In particular, we looked for evidence that the observed changes in price or wage inflation did
not correspond to predictions based on standard Phillips curve relationships and for instances of
changes in relative demand pressures in product and labour markets.
As indicators of resource utilisation, we use the log difference between actual and potential GDP
(Gap)
16 as calculated by the OECD and the deviation of actual unemployment from our own estimates
of the NAIRU (U*-U),
17 both measured as five-year averages for the three subperiods shown in the
table. As indicators of inflation, we used the private consumption deflator and compensation per
employee in the business sector; for both indicators, Table 7 includes two measures: the average rate
of inflation for each five-year period (pc and w) and the change in the rate of inflation during each
subperiod ((pc) and (w)). The last two columns of the table give a sense of how the actual
movements in the data correspond to the simple bivariate correlations implicit in simple Phillips curve
relationships. In particular, a positive (negative) output gap might be expected to be associated with a
rising (falling) rate of price inflation. Thus, a positive sign in the penultimate column ((pc)/Gap) of
the table would indicate that the change in inflation is consistent with the hypothesised relationship,
while a negative sign signals either that inflation has increased in a period when the output gap was
negative or that inflation has fallen despite a positive gap. To identify possible asymmetries, the ratios
are written in italics for periods of negative output gaps. The last column of the table contains a
corresponding measure of the relationship between changes in the rate of wage inflation and labour
market slack ((w)/(U* - U)). As with the product market measure, the ratio is constructed so that a
negative sign is indicative of an unusual development, such as wage inflation falling (rising) when
actual unemployment is below (above) the estimated NAIRUs.
For all countries, the early 1990s is the principal period of disinflation. Although declining rates of
inflation are not surprising given that six of the eight countries recorded negative output gaps during
this period, the degree of disinflation of both wage and price inflation is unusually large. This is
particularly noticeable for the United Kingdom, Australia and Switzerland, but the decline in wage
inflation in Spain and Sweden is also worth noting. Apart from the size of disinflation in these
countries, the only ￿surprises￿ during the early 1990s were that both wage and price inflation declined
in Japan and Spain, despite excess demand in both product and labour markets. For Japan, however,
the OECD￿s estimate of the output gap is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, while in the case of
Spain, the high rate of measured unemployment makes it difficult to derive a reliable measure of
labour market slack, particularly for the 1990s, when measures deregulating the labour market were
introduced.
While the early 1990s stand out as a period of disinflation with relatively few surprises, the second half
of the 1990s contain several surprises but a relatively low degree of disinflation.
18 In terms of country-
specific developments, the decline in price inflation in a period of excess demand in the product
market is a main area of surprise for the United States, whereas wage developments are largely in line
with predictions of a Phillips curve style relationship.
19 For Japan, the movements during 1995-99
                                                     
16 It would have been preferable to use rates of capacity utilisation as a complementary or alternative indicator, but
comparable utilisation measures are only available for some of the countries.
17 Estimates of a time-varying U* were derived by applying a Kalman filter to an Okun￿s law relationship using the OECD￿s
estimates of potential GDP. Thus for UU* or excess demand in the labour market, the deviation will be positive and
comparable to the Gap measure of conditions in the output market.
18 For several countries (notably Japan and Switzerland), the low degree of disinflation is a ￿non-surprise￿ given that the rate of
price inflation had already fallen to very low levels by the end of the 1990-94 period. In other countries (the United Kingdom,
Canada and Australia), the decline in wage inflation may have slowed as actual rates of unemployment came closer to, or
fell below, the estimated NAIRUs.
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largely correspond to the predictions of the Phillips curve: price inflation declined in the presence of a
large and widening output gap while wages decelerated in response to rising unemployment.
Nonetheless, the fact that the rate of disinflation did not increase as the output gap widened is
surprising and might indicate a change in firms￿ price setting behaviour.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the principal period of disinflation was obviously the first half of the
1990s: price inflation declined by 5.5 percentage points despite a relatively small output gap, while
wage inflation declined by almost 7 percentage points, even though the actual rate of unemployment
was only slightly above the estimated NAIRU. Developments during the second period are similar to
those observed for the United States. The main surprise is that price inflation declined further despite
a positive output gap. In contrast, the acceleration of wages is in line with unemployment falling below
the NAIRU.
For Canada, the changes observed in inflation and activity measures are in line with predictions from
the Phillips curve for both the first and the second half of the 1990s, though the smaller degree of
deceleration during the second half is worth noting.
20 As in the United Kingdom, the early 1990s were
the principal period of disinflation in Australia. However, even though there were signs of excess
demand in both product and labour markets during 1995-99, prices and wages continued to
decelerate. The fact that wages also continued to decelerate in Spain, Sweden and Switzerland is less
surprising, as actual rates of unemployment exceeded the NAIRU. Similarly, the continued decline in
price inflation is in line with predictions from the Phillips curve as all three countries recorded relatively
large output gaps.
b. Price and wage model forecast errors
We next turn to an evaluation of forecast errors from our own price and wage equations. Our
procedure is as follows:
21
  First, we estimated wage and price equations for the period 1960-90 using an error
correction model allowing for wage-price feedbacks in both levels and first differences;
22
  Second, when the error correction term was insignificant, we reestimated the equations and
tested the homogeneity constraint implied by the assumption that wage and price inflation
are I(1) processes;
  Third, when the price-wage feedback term in first differences was also insignificant, we
estimated reduced-form price equations with and without the homogeneity constraint;
  Finally, the most satisfactory versions were used to make forecasts for the period 1991-99
and reestimated over the full sample period (1960-99) in an attempt to identify parameter
changes as possible sources of forecast errors.
Price equations
The price equations estimated under the first step mentioned above were specified as:
23
                                                     
20 The behaviour of price inflation in Canada in part depends on the measure used. While the change in the private
consumption deflator was largely constant during 1995-99, inflation measured by the GDP deflator declined by
0.6 percentage points. In contrast, during 1990-94 the GDP deflator decelerated by only 2 percentage points, compared with
more than 3 percentage points for the consumption deflator.
21 Before adopting this procedure, we tested the dynamic properties of the relevant variables, using an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test. With the exception of Switzerland, the tests suggested that price inflation is an I(1) process, while wage inflation
is found to be I(1) in all countries save Australia. As might be expected, the output gap is I(0) while actual unemployment
tends to be I(1). However, when measured as a deviation from the NAIRU, unemployment also becomes I(0).
22 For some countries, we had to derive our own estimates for the output gap in the 1960s, using a quadratic trend and the
rate of unemployment, and then combine them with the output gaps published by the OECD.
23 It is debatable whether the GDP deflator or the consumption deflator should be used in measuring real compensation. Since
the price equation refers to consumer price inflation, we used the consumption deflator. We also estimated an alternative set
of regressions, using changes in unit labour costs instead of compensation per employee. Significant coefficients of the
expected positive sign were only found for Canada and Sweden, but only when the sample period was extended to include280 BIS Papers No 3
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Where pc denotes the (log) private consumption deflator, w (log) compensation per employee, q (log)
output per employed person, Gap the output gap, and pm (log) import prices. Subscripts refer to lags
in years and  is the first-difference operator.
In equation (9), the coefficient on the error correction term (
) is expected to be positive if a decline in
real wages relative to productivity puts downward pressure on prices.
24 However, when 
 was
negative or insignificant, the price equation was specified as:
                          ) ( 1 1 2 1 1 pc pm w pc pc Gap pc (10)
As the unit root tests frequently indicated that price inflation was I(1), we also estimated a variant of
(10) constraining the coefficients on lagged rates of price and wage inflation to sum to unity (ie with
 imposed). Finally, in those cases where we were unable to identify any significant wage-price
feedbacks, we dropped the lagged wage term for both the unconstrained and constrained versions of
the model.
Before discussing the results from our preferred specifications, it is worth pointing out that estimates of
(9) provided little support for the hypothesis that firms increase prices in response to a rise in real unit
labour costs (or a fall in the mark-up). For five countries we obtained the ￿wrong￿ sign and in two cases
the coefficient on real unit labour costs was insignificant, albeit positive. Only Sweden exhibited a
positive and significant coefficient, although this result was limited to the longer sample period.
The estimates obtained from equation (10) also provided little evidence of wage-price feedbacks. In
particular, statistically significant coefficients on the lagged wage terms were evident only for Japan,
Switzerland and Spain.
25 In the case of Japan, the addition of lagged wage changes was a significant
improvement compared with the results obtained from the price equations excluding this feedback.
The diagnostic statistics were better and, above all, the tendency to overpredict was much lower. For
Switzerland and Spain, we also obtained significant coefficients for the lagged change in wages, and
the forecasts derived from this specification were fairly accurate. Overall, however, the results were
less satisfactory than those based on the reduced-form price equations. Particularly for Spain, this
finding is somewhat surprising as the deceleration of wages has been more pronounced than in most
other countries; yet, lagged wage changes seem to have had only a marginal impact on the path of
consumer prices.
As a result, with the exception of Japan, Table 8a only presents estimates for the reduced-form price
equations. However, because there are major differences in their ability to forecast, we report results
for both the unconstrained and the constrained versions of the model.
Turning first to the estimates for the unconstrained equations, the coefficients on the output gap range
from 0.2 to 0.6 and are statistically significant for six of the eight countries. Except for Japan, where
lagged changes in wages dominate lagged price changes, all the coefficients on the one-year lagged
inflation term have significant t-values. In contrast, most of the coefficients on the two-year lagged
inflation term are insignificant, though none of the t-values is less than unity. Changes in relative
import prices, which were included as a proxy for supply shocks, are significant for all countries, and in
several cases the coefficients are close to the import share of GDP. The autocorrelation statistics are
not indicative of specification errors and the R
2s range from 0.7 to 0.95.
For the constrained version, the coefficient on the output gap is higher for five of the countries, but is
somewhat lower for Switzerland and, especially, Australia. Most of the coefficients on the lagged
inflation terms are negative and imply a slightly greater influence of one-year lagged inflation as
compared with the unconstrained version; in the case of Japan, the influence of lagged changes in
                                                                                                                                                                     
the 1990s. Finally, we experimented with longer lags on the determining variables in (9) but, with the exceptions of Australia
(two-year lag on the output gap) and the United Kingdom (both current and one-year lagged changes in import prices
significant), the lag specification shown in equation (9) worked best.
24 More particularly, since wages decelerated faster than consumer prices during the 1990s, leaving out the feedback from
wages to prices might be a source of overpredicting price inflation. Moreover, as found by Brayton et al (1999) and Gali et al
(2000), firms￿ pricing decisions seem to have been affected by deviations of real unit labour costs from their long-run trend.
25 Replacing compensation per employee with a measure of unit labour costs did not change this result.BIS Papers No 3 281
real wages has the right sign but is not significant. The influence of relative import prices is relatively
stable, the largest change being observed for Switzerland.
According to the F-statistics shown in the penultimate row of the table, the homogeneity constraint is
rejected for five of the countries, most convincingly for those (Switzerland, the United  States and
Australia) where pc is (or is close to being) an I(0) variable. Nonetheless, except for the United
Kingdom, the constrained version produces smaller forecast errors than the unconstrained version
despite the fact that the constrained version assigns larger weights to past rates of inflation and that
inflation decelerated during the 1990s.
26 This finding stands in contrast to the results reported by Stock
and Watson (1999) who find that the unconstrained version of their model generates better forecasts
for US inflation in the more recent years when inflation was low and close to being an I(0) variable.
Looking more specifically at the size of the forecast errors, Australia, Spain, and Canada show the
largest cumulative errors for simulations based on the unconstrained equation, while those for
Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom are quite small.
27 Together with Japan, these
are also the only countries for which inflation is actually underpredicted for the 1990s once the
homogeneity constraint is imposed.
28
The parameters obtained when extending the sample period to 1999 are presented in Table 8b. For
neither the unconstrained nor the constrained version of the price equation can the hypothesis of
parameter stability be rejected for any country when the test is applied to all the parameters jointly.
29
Nonetheless, there are notable changes in the point estimates of the coefficients which may help to
explain the forecast errors discussed above:
  For most countries, the intercept term declines when the sample is extended to include the
1990s. The decline is most pronounced for Australia and Spain; ie the two countries with the
largest prediction errors in Table 8a;
  For both Japan and Australia, the influence of product market conditions declines
significantly when the 1990s are included. In the case of Japan, this implies that the rise in
the output gap since 1997 has had a smaller disinflationary (or deflationary) impact than
suggested by historical patterns. For Australia, the rise in actual relative to potential GDP
during the second half of the 1990s had a smaller impact on the rate of inflation than the
historical estimates would have implied. Spain also experienced a decline, albeit small, in the
gap coefficient while Canada shows a slight increase. For the other four countries, there
were virtually no changes in the parameter on the output gap;
  As discussed earlier, there is some ambiguity with respect to the influence of lagged inflation
in a low-inflation regime. The results obtained by extending the sample period to include the
1990s ￿straddle the fence￿ between the opposing views, as the sum of the coefficients on the
lagged inflation terms change only marginally. The main exceptions are Australia and
Switzerland, for which inflation persistence increases somewhat;
                                                     
26 A marked drop in the intercept terms in the constrained equations accounts for a substantial part (largest for Switzerland
and Australia and lowest for Canada and Spain) of the smaller overprediction for the 1990s. However, since we know little
about the causes of this change, its contribution should be regarded as a quantification of our surprise rather than as an
explanation.
27 We also calculated forecast errors based on dynamic simulations. While this method increased the size of the errors, the
ranking of the countries did not change.
28 Using the unconstrained equation, it appears that the forecast errors for the United States and Australia were evenly
distributed between the two halves of the 1990s, while for Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada and Spain the
overpredictions were most pronounced during the first half, when the speed of disinflation was also most pronounced. The
equation for Switzerland underpredicted inflation during the first half but overpredicted during the second half, while the
errors for Sweden are dominated by an especially large miss in 1991. We also tested whether the tendency to overpredict
increased as the rate of inflation declined by regressing the forecast errors on the actual rates of inflation. The hypothesis is
confirmed for the whole sample period. However, when the regression is confined to the out-of-sample prediction errors, we
only obtain significant and negative coefficients for Sweden and Switzerland.
29 On the assumption that structural changes have taken place but that the source of the changes is not known, we also
estimated the price equations allowing the intercept term to differ after 1990. For the unconstrained model, the coefficients
on the dummy variable were always negative but statistically significant only for Australia, though the coefficients for Japan
and Canada also obtained relatively high t-values. The coefficients for the constrained model were also mostly negative but
never came close to being significant.282 BIS Papers No 3
  The hypothesis that the parameters of the price equation may be regime-dependent is also
not supported by the coefficients obtained for changes in relative import prices in the
extended sample. Except for Sweden, for which the pass-through actually increases,
30 the
coefficients remain remarkably constant, suggesting that the influence of changes in relative
import prices in the 1990s was little different from that of earlier decades.
To sum up, when extending the sample period to 1999, the cumulative within-sample forecast errors
for both the unconstrained and the constrained equations decline to only marginal levels and, except
for Sweden, the principal parameter change contributing to this improvement is the decline in the
intercept term. For the two countries with the largest forecast errors when using the shorter sample
(Australia and Spain), the lower intercept terms would imply a cumulative reduction in the inflation
forecasts of 4-8 percentage points. However, while these results are indicative of structural change,
there is little information as to what might have caused this decline.
Wage equations
Similar to the procedure used for estimating price equations, we initially attempted to explain wage
changes using a specification with an error correction term:
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with w denoting log compensation per employee, U-U* the deviation between actual unemployment
and the NAIRU, pc the log private consumption deflator, q log productivity,  the first-difference
operator, i = 1, 2 and j = 0, 1. On the assumption that employees will push for higher wages when their
income share declines, the coefficient on the error correction term (
) is expected to be negative.
However, when 
 was either positive or insignificant, (11) was reestimated without the error correction
term:
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Moreover, since the gap between actual unemployment and the NAIRUs is an I(0) variable and wage
inflation in most countries is I(1), we also estimated an equation with consistent dynamic structures by
forcing the coefficients on the lagged wage and price changes to sum to unity (ie with i	j).
31 As
with the constrained price equation, the dynamics of the inflation process are reflected in the lagged
dependent variable while the lagged change in real wages captures potential feedbacks between price
and wage inflation. However, in contrast to the price equations, for which we were able to use fairly
similar specifications for all countries, it turned out to be far more difficult to find comparable wage
equations. In several cases it was necessary to extend the lag structure on price changes in order to
obtain specifications that did not suffer from autocorrelation. Moreover, for three countries, actual
unemployment rather than the unemployment gap seemed to be the best indicator of labour market
conditions.
The results obtained from applying the same four-step procedure as for price inflation are displayed in
Tables 9a (shorter sample period) and 9b (extended sample period). In general, the cumulative
forecast errors tend to be of the same size as for prices, though three differences compared with the
price equations are worth noting. First, for about half the countries, the constrained equation does not
generate lower forecast errors, even though the constraint is never rejected. Second, wage inflation for
the 1990s is underpredicted in half the cases, while for price inflation, positive forecast errors were
recorded for nearly all countries. Third, when the sample period is extended to include the 1990s,
                                                     
30 This seems to be the principal reason for the lower forecast error for Sweden. However, the autocorrelation coefficients
suggest that the equation is misspecified when the data sample includes the 1990s.
31 On the assumption that wage demands may be influenced by expected developments in labour productivity, we also
estimated equations including changes in output per person employed, smoothed by an HP filter. In all cases, the
productivity term entered with a positive coefficient and for about half the countries it was also significant. However, in most
cases, the overall fit was inferior to those of (11) and (12) and coefficients that were significant in (11) and (12) were less
precisely estimated. The only exceptions were Japan and Switzerland, for which the addition of changes in productivity
substantially improved the fit. However, as discussed below, even better results for these two countries were obtained when
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parameter stability is rejected (or is close to being rejected) for about half the countries; in contrast, the
coefficients of price inflation were mostly stable.
Turning to the results for individual countries, the wage equation for the United States slightly
underpredicts wage inflation in the 1990s. The homogeneity constraint is not rejected and the
coefficients not only confirm the long lag structure found in other analyses of US wage inflation but
also suggest that current wage inflation tends to rise in response to past declines in real wages (see
also Gordon (1998)). When the equations are extended to include the 1990s, there are signs of
parameter instability. In particular, the lag structure appears to have become shorter while the
response of current wages to past changes in real wages increases somewhat. The intercept term
also increases, perhaps indicative of stronger productivity growth and associated real wage gains,
while the sensitivity to the unemployment gap is unchanged.
The unconstrained wage equation for the United Kingdom has the highest prediction errors in our
sample, though the errors are concentrated in the first half of the 1990s, when the deceleration of
wages was most pronounced. The imposition of the homogeneity constraint leads to a marked decline
in the intercept term and a stronger reaction to changes in labour market conditions, significantly
improving the accuracy of the predictions. Unlike the equations for the United States, the coefficients
appear to be stable when the sample period is extended to 1999, although the tendency to overpredict
remains. Another feature of the UK equation, and a possible source of the overpredictions, might be
that the coefficient on the one-year lagged inflation rate exceeds unity. In a period of rapidly
decelerating prices, this tends to keep wages growing faster than they otherwise would have done.
For both Canada and Australia, the actual rate of unemployment (lagged one year) produced better
results than the unemployment gap. Nevertheless, a specification with U rather than U-U* raises
several questions. First, such a specification implicitly assumes that U* has been constant over the
period, in contrast to the pattern suggested by the NAIRUs calculated from the OECD output gaps.
Second, there are issues about the correct modelling of the dynamic structures. If wage inflation is an
I(1) variable, the unconstrained version of equation (12) would be the correct specification, assuming
that w and U are cointegrated. Conversely, if wage inflation is I(0), an error correction term should be
included (as in equation (11)) to ensure dynamic consistency.
For Canada, the empirical evidence favours the first hypothesis. Even though wage inflation is close to
being I(0), the error correction term was insignificant and had the wrong sign.
32 In addition, equation
(12) yields smaller cumulative forecast errors than for any other country. Moreover, there is no sign of
parameter instability when the sample is extended to include the 1990s, possibly suggesting that the
equation is capturing a cointegrating relationship between wage inflation and the rate of
unemployment that is suppressed in the constrained version.
The estimates for Australia are considerably more problematic.
33 First, the dynamic response of wages
to prices is highly erratic, with a large positive coefficient on the first lag of inflation and a large
negative coefficient on the second lag. This pattern produces large prediction errors for individual
years, with both the constrained and unconstrained versions of the model underpredicting wage
inflation in the 1990s by a cumulative 19 percentage points.
34 Second, including an error correction
term, as in (11), helped only little. The volatile dynamic structure remained and the coefficient on the
error correction term was insignificant, though of the right sign. Third, while parameter stability cannot
be rejected when the sample is extended to include the 1990s, the coefficient on the unemployment
rate does decline substantially, and this change alone reduces the predicted wage changes in the
1990s by a cumulative 15‰ percentage points. However, while the parameter shift is significant, it
raises the question as to why, in a period of deregulation and a more flexible labour market, wage
earners in Australia should have become less sensitive to changing market conditions. Indeed, the
                                                     
32 When the error correction terms were included together with (U-U*), we obtained a highly significant coefficient of the
correct (negative) sign. However, U-U* still provided no explanatory power.
33 We attempted to compare our estimates with those presented in Gruen et al (1999). However, their results are based on
four-quarter changes of consumer prices and unit labour costs and the time profile of their estimates of the NAIRU is quite
different from ours, making such comparisons difficult.
34 We experimented with various lag structures for both wage and price inflation, but those shown in the tables produced the
best diagnostic statistics as well as the smallest overall prediction errors.284 BIS Papers No 3
downgrading of the Arbitration system and the greater role of bargaining at the firm level would seem
to point to a greater sensitivity of wages to labour market developments.
Sweden is another country for which wage inflation in the 1990s is underpredicted and, again, the
main source of the prediction errors appears to be parameter instability, with the largest shifts
observed for the intercept term and the coefficients on the level of and changes in the unemployment
gap. For the constrained version, these parameter changes alone ￿explain￿ 75% of the cumulative
underpredictions. There is also some decline in the influence of current price inflation and lagged
wages, but this changes the predictions only marginally.
The wage equation for Spain contains a relatively large autoregressive component which, combined
with the sharp deceleration of wages in the 1990s, appears to be the main source of the
overpredictions. The feedback from prices to wages is relatively moderate and, except for the intercept
term, the parameters remain rather stable for the longer sample period. Although the homogeneity
constraint cannot be rejected, the constrained version of (12) predicts less well and produces less
satisfactory diagnostic statistics.
We next turn to the two countries for which the specification including an error correction term
(equation (11)) produced the best results. In the case of Switzerland, adding the error correction term
leads to a substantial improvement compared with the properties of equation (12), including a marked
decline in autocorrelation and a dynamic structure that looks more plausible. Moreover, the
unemployment gap is highly significant, the R
2 rises to 0.87, the cumulative prediction error is only
0.7 percentage points, and the parameter estimates change little when the sample is extended to
include the 1990s.
At first glance, the wage equation for Japan also looks plausible when allowing for price-wage
feedbacks. The error correction term is highly significant and the diagnostic statistics are satisfactory.
Moreover, because real unit labour costs increased by almost 5% during the first half of the 1990s,
significantly depressing wage demands later in the decade, wage inflation is underpredicted by a
cumulative 7‰ percentage points, compared with an overprediction of 14‰ percentage points when
using equation (12).
35 Yet, the addition of real unit labour costs is not entirely satisfactory. Even
though the hypothesis of parameter stability cannot be rejected when the sample period is extended to
include the 1990s and the within-sample forecast error is reduced to less than 3 percentage points,
there are clear signs of parameter instability, as both the intercept term and the coefficient on
unemployment become insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on the error correction term increases
(in absolute terms) to 24.7, almost twice the value obtained for the shorter sample.
5. Conclusions
An important and welcome feature of economic developments in the 1990s was the extent to which
inflation fell in an environment of high or rising economic activity and tightening labour markets. At the
same time, the fact that most forecasters underestimated the degree of disinflationary pressure during
the decade raises questions about the appropriate stance of monetary policy. If the forecast errors
mainly reflect the effects of favourable supply shocks but policymakers attribute them to permanent
structural changes, there is a risk that monetary policy will be too expansionary and that the
disinflationary gains will be lost. Conversely, if the unexpected declines in inflation are due to
irrevocable changes in the inflation process but policymakers interpret them as only transitory, policies
might be kept too tight, with a risk that potential gains in output and employment will not be realised.
In this paper, we first document the extent to which inflation was overpredicted in the 1990s, using a
sample of eight industrialised countries and forecasts produced by the OECD as well as by our own
models. According to both sources, the overprediction of inflationary pressures has been most
pronounced for prices, whereas wage gains have been more in line with predictions based on
traditional Phillips curves. This is an important finding as it suggests that the source of the forecast
                                                     
35 The change in the sign of the prediction errors might be related to the fact that when including real unit labour costs as a
determinant, the measured rate of unemployment (rather than its deviation from the NAIRU) appears to be the appropriate
measure of labour market slack.BIS Papers No 3 285
errors is mainly to be found in firms￿ price setting behaviour. At the same time, it leaves open the
question of whether the implied reduction in firms￿ mark-ups reflect favourable supply shocks, such as
lower relative import prices and one-time productivity gains, or a more permanent erosion of firms￿
pricing power due to other factors, such as globalisation and deregulation of product markets.
Consequently, the paper attempts to identify the sources of the apparent change in firms￿ price setting
behaviour, relying again on forecasts made by the OECD and our own price and wage equations, and
using a wide range of econometric and non-econometric tests. While we do find some evidence of
structural shifts in the inflation process, in only a few cases are we able to identify the source of these
shifts. Moreover, the significant changes that we find differ widely across the eight countries in their
nature as well as their size. For instance, for the United States and Australia it appears that higher
productivity gains are a main source of the tendency to overpredict price inflation. In contrast, the
overpredictions of inflation in Japan and Switzerland seem to reflect movements in real unit labour
costs (or mark-ups), which traditional Phillips curves tend to ignore. In the case of Sweden, favourable
import price shocks appear to be the main source of overpredicting consumer price inflation while for
the three remaining countries (the United Kingdom, Canada and Spain) we were unable to find any
dominant cause.
In some ways, it is not surprising that we are unable to find a unique explanation of these forecast
errors. While disinflation and monetary policies aimed at price stability were common to all countries
during the 1990s, the accompanying cyclical developments progressively diverged. In the  four
English-speaking countries, economic activity tended to exceed earlier estimates of potential output
levels, while continental Europe experienced a slow and moderate recovery from the recession in the
early 1990s and Japan moved deeper into recession. The processes of deregulation also differed. In
the United States, few regulations were left by the start of the 1990s, and the other English-speaking
countries either took major steps to deregulate labour and product markets during the 1990s or had
already done so during the late 1980s. In continental Europe, by contrast, progress has been much
slower, and even though many rigidities have been removed, these changes have probably not yet
affected the inflation process in a significant way. Finally, in Japan, major reforms have been
announced but the implementation of reform measures has barely started. As a result, the influence of
globalisation and developments associated with the new economy on firms￿ price setting behaviour is
likely to have differed widely, being most pronounced in those countries that have gone furthest in
liberalising their markets.
In addition to our inability to clearly identify and explain the sources of the changes we find, the paper
leaves a number of other questions unresolved, some of which are also relevant to policies. One
puzzling result is that the homogeneity constraints on the price equations are often rejected, and yet
the constrained versions produce more accurate forecasts. Related to this, and of potential importance
to forecasting procedures, we were unable to find any evidence of the regime-dependent changes in
the parameters of the inflation process highlighted in recent empirical work. In particular, neither the
OECD forecasts nor our own estimates suggest that economic agents tend to ignore inflation when it
is very low or that the pass-through of import prices and other costs is smaller in a low-inflation
environment. Another puzzle is that even though our estimated price equations tend to overpredict
inflation in the 1990s, the parameters appear to be stable. In contrast, several of our wage equations
show signs of parameter instability but produce forecasts that are less biased. Whatever the source of
this inconsistency and despite the evidence pointing to changes in firms￿ price setting behaviour as the
likely source of the forecast errors, it implies that in order to better understand the inflation process in
the 1990s, it is important to look at both the price and the wage components of the Phillips curve
framework.
Against this background, it is also not surprising that the empirical evidence we present does not
clearly favour any of the alternative theoretical explanations of recent inflation performance discussed
in Section 2, either for the eight countries as a group or for any individual country. In particular, even
though parameter shifts and specific sources of forecast errors have been identified in a number of
cases, we are unable to distinguish between one-time shock effects and permanent changes in the
inflation process. This is unfortunate and disappointing from a policy point of view; however, it should
not be regarded as a major surprise, considering that most of our evidence is based on only nine
years of observations while the debate about shocks versus permanent changes is at least 25 years
old.286 BIS Papers No 3
Table 1
Forecast errors for US inflation
OECD (PCE deflator) FOMC (CPI)
Year
Forecast Outcome Difference Forecast
1 Outcome Difference
1991 4.6 3.8 0.8 4.1 3.0 1.1
1992 3.9 3.1 0.8 3.5 3.1 0.4
1993 3.2 2.4 0.8 3.0 2.7 0.3
1994 2.8 2.0 0.8 2.7 2.6 0.1
1995 3.1 2.3 0.8 3.1 2.7 0.4
1996 3.4 2.1 1.3 3.1 3.1 0.0
1997 2.3 2.0 0.3 2.9 1.9 1.0
1998 2.4 0.9 1.5 2.7 1.5 1.2
1999 1.7 1.6 0.1 2.2 2.6 ￿ 0.4
1  Based on the midpoint of the central tendency.
Table 2
Forecast errors for price inflation in the 1990s
Selected countries, 1991-99, annual data
United
States Japan United
Kingdom Canada Australia Spain Sweden Switzerland
Summary
statistics
MAE 0.80 0.53 0.58 0.67 1.36 0.57 1.23 1.00




2 0.26 ￿ 0.12 0.58
1 1.36
2 ￿ 0.32 0.33 0.32
U
M 0.81 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.88 0.22 0.06 0.07
% > 0 1.00 0.78 0.33 0.89 1.00 0.33 0.78 0.78
Efficiency
 0.29 0.25 1.69 0.19 0.50 ￿ 0.04 1.06 2.54
2
1 ￿  0.17 0.00 ￿ 0.53 0.17 0.26
1 ￿ 0.07 ￿ 0.20 ￿ 0.95
2
Joint F-test 17.30
2 0.70 1.19 3.69
1 46.16





2 0.01 0.17 0.46 2.54 0.43 1.70 2.00
Q(2) 9.46
2 3.78 0.36 0.65 2.68 0.65 3.84 2.19
Definitions: Price inflation is measured as the percentage change in the personal consumption deflator. Forecast errors are
measured as forecast less outcome; ie a positive (negative) error indicates that inflation has been over-(under-)predicted.
Notation: MAE = mean average forecast error; RMSE = root mean squared errors; mean = average forecast error; U
M = the
proportion of the mean squared error due to the mean error; % > 0 = the proportion of years in which the OECD
overpredicted inflation;  and 1 ￿  = coefficients obtained when regressing forecast errors for year t on an intercept term and
the predicted inflation rate for year t; joint F-test tests the hypothesis  = 0 and  = 1; Q(1) and Q(2) = Ljung-Box Q-statistics
for 1 and 2 lags respectively.
1  and  
2  denote 90 and 95% levels of significance.BIS Papers No 3 287
Table 3
Forecast errors for wage inflation in the 1990s
Selected countries, 1991-99, annual data
United
States Japan United
Kingdom Canada Australia Spain Sweden Switzerland
Summary
statistics
MAE 1.13 1.65 1.56 1.14 1.47 2.16 1.43 0.85




1 0.39 0.34 1.21
1 ￿ 0.04 0.19 0.32
U
M 0.15 0.78 0.04 0.05 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.09
% > 0 0.55 1.00 0.56 0.89 0.89 0.67 0.44 0.56
Efficiency
 ￿ 0.94 1.36 ￿ 1.28 ￿ 1.14 ￿ 2.42 6.61
1 ￿ 2.69 0.69
1 ￿  0.35 0.11 0.32 0.45 0.82 ￿ 1.36
1 0.64 ￿ 0.12
Joint F-test 0.78 12.73





Q(1) 0.00 1.18 3.10 0.24 0.57 2.34 0.24 0.19
Q(2) 0.00 2.59 3.12 0.32 0.97 2.51 0.13 0.28
Definitions: Wage inflation is measured as the percentage change in compensation per employee. Forecast errors are
measured as forecast less outcome; ie a positive (negative) error indicates that inflation has been over-(under-)predicted.
Notation: MAE = mean average forecast error; RMSE = root mean squared errors; mean = average forecast error; U
M = the
proportion of the mean squared error due to the mean error; % > 0 = the proportion of years in which the OECD
overpredicted inflation;  and 1 ￿  = coefficients obtained when regressing forecast errors for year t on an intercept term and
the predicted inflation rate for year t; joint F-test tests the hypothesis =0 and =1; Q(1) and Q(2) = Ljung-Box Q-statistics for
1 and 2 lags respectively.
1  Denotes a 95% level of significance.288 BIS Papers No 3
Table 4
Exogenous variables: means (   ) and average forecast errors (   )
1991-99, based on data as of June 2000
Import prices
(%   )
Productivity





                        
United  States ￿ 0.9 1.6 1.8 ￿ 0.6
2 5.8 ￿ 0.1 ￿ 0.2 0.8
Japan ￿ 2.6 3.9 0.9 1.1
2 3.1 ￿ 0.3
3 ￿ 0.6 0.0
United
Kingdom 0.3 2.0 1.9 0.3 8.2 ￿ 0.1 ￿ 0.6 ￿ 1.2
3
Canada 1.7 0.0 1.2 0.4 9.7 ￿ 0.3 ￿ 2.3 0.9
Australia 0.5 0.7 2.4 ￿ 1.0
3 9.0 ￿ 0.2 ￿ 0.4 ￿ 0.7
Spain 2.5 0.1 1.5 0.1 20.0 ￿ 0.1 ￿ 0.5 0.4
Sweden 2.3 0.3 2.5 ￿ 1.1
3 6.7 ￿ 0.7
2 ￿ 2.4 1.4
2
Switzerland ￿ 0.8 3.0
3 0.4 0.9
2 3.7 ￿ 0.5 ￿ 2.3
1 ￿ 0.8
1
Average 0.4 1.5 1.6 0.0 8.3 ￿ 0.3 ￿ 1.2 0.1
1  Output gap forecasts for Switzerland are only available from 1996 to 1999.  
2  and  
3  denote 90% and 95% levels of
significance.
Table 5
Bivariate regressions of forecast errors
1
1991-99, based on data as of June 2000
Import prices Productivity Unemployment Output gap    pc or    w
Country
   pc    w    pc    w    pc    w    pc    w    pc    w
United States 0.20
4 0.05 ￿ 0.50
3 0.44 ￿ 0.08 0.44 ￿ 0.08 0.60 0.31 0.61
Japan 0.05
4 0.09 ￿ 0.68
3 0.57
3 0.12 0.57
3 0.12 0.12 0.15 1.34
United
Kingdom ￿ 0.05 ￿ 0.24
3 ￿ 0.76 ￿ 0.23 0.87
3 ￿ 0.23 0.87
3 ￿ 0.23 0.11 0.35
Canada ￿ 0.07 ￿ 0.16 0.31 0.31 ￿ 0.19 0.31 ￿ 0.19 0.32 0.32
3 1.06
3
Australia 0.12 ￿ 0.04 ￿ 0.63
3 ￿ 0.39 ￿ 0.46 ￿ 0.39 ￿ 0.46 ￿ 0.02 0.60
4 0.84
4
Spain 0.12 ￿ 0.08 0.18 1.19 0.08 1.19 0.08 ￿ 0.67 0.04 0.46
Sweden 0.18
4 0.05 ￿ 0.07 ￿ 0.08 0.38 ￿ 0.08 0.38 0.14 0.24 0.32
Switzerland 0.08 0.13 ￿ 0.31 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.30
2 0.50 0.41
1  Coefficients are those obtained by regressing (with no intercept term) forecast errors for 	pc and 	w on forecast errors for
the exogenous variables listed at the top, with the figures in the last column showing the coefficients from bivariate
regressions between forecast errors for 	pc and 	w.  
2  Based on only four observations.  
3  and 
4  denote 90% and 95%
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